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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
)

DIANA BEHRENS, individually
and as Guardian ad Litem of
NATHAN ALAN BEHRENS,

)

Appellants,

Case No. 18093

)

v.

)

RALEIGH HILLS HOSPITAL, INC. I

)

Respondent.

APPELLANTS'REPLY TO
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

)

BACKGROUND
The Utah Supreme Court granted appellants' Petition for
Review after the District Court refused to allow them to amend
their complaint to include punitive damages.

The amendment was

requested after appellants' $100,000 jury verdict was set aside
by the trial judge because of errors in the instructions.

Rule

15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows that leave to
amend a party's pleading shall be freely given when justice so
requires.

Appellants ask only to be allowed to prove their puni-

tive claim at trial.

Respondent will not be prejudiced in any

way in that appellants' claim for punitive damages is based
upon the same facts, the same parties, the same incident, the
same evidence, the same testimony, and the same documents.

Respon-

dents' brief adds nothing new or different to the argument than has·
already been brought before the court in respondent's Motion for
Summary Disposition.

Appellants respond with essentially their

reply to respondent's first brief.

*

*
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
APPELLANTS' MOTION WAS PROPERLY
BEFORE THE cobRT.
Appellants brought their motion pursuant to a notice of
hearing on appellants' motion to amend complaint, and memorandum
of support and authorities.
Said motion was noticed up on the court's calendar.

At

the hearing of the motion, attorneys for appellants were there,
respondent's counsel was there, and court called it, the court
heard argmnent, the court made its order and the respondent
even prepared the order which was entitled "Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaintf)"

Said Order stated:

"Plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint to assert
a claim for punitive damages came on regularly for
hearing before the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, one of
the judges of the above entitled court at Court's
Building in Salt Lake City, Utah, on the 6th day of
October, 1981, at 2:00 P.M., plaintiff being present
in court and represented by her attorney James E.
Hawkes; and defendant being present in court and
represented by its attorney, Robert F. Orton, of the
firm of Marsden, Orton and Liljenquist; and the court
having reviewed the pleadings and papers on file,
having heard argument of cousel, having been fully
advised in the premises and good cause appearing . . . . "
[Emphasis added]
The order went on to deny appellants' right to amend their
complaint.

Reviewing the file, appellants cannot find a plead-

ing solely entitled "Motion," but respondent's Order determined
that appellants' motion came on regularly.
Appellants have not filed an amended complaint since
appellants do not have any right to file an amended complaint
until the court so orders and then only to the extent as ordered
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by the court.

Appellants' Memorandum of Support gave respondent

ample opportunity ot understand what appellants desired in their
amended complaint.
POINT II.
APPELLANTS' PROPOSED AMENDED COMPLAINT
IS NOT UNTIMELY AND WILL NOT ASSERT A
NEW CAUSE OF ACTION.
A. The statute of limitations of an action against a health
care provider (UCA 78-14-4) states:
"No malpractice action against a health care provider
may be brought unless it is conunenced within two years
after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through
the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered
the injury, whichever first occurs, but not to· exceed
four years after the date of the alleged act, omission,
neglect or occurrence."
Four years has not run since the death of appellants' father/
husband.

The only question is whether two years have run since

appellants knew or should have known of their claim for punitive
damages.

The requirement, as stated in Foil v. Ballinger, 601

P2d 144 (1979), is,

"The discover of the injury means discovery of the
injury and the negligence which resulted in the
injury."
[Emphasis added]
At the time the original complaint was filed, the appellants had no knowledge of the degree of respondent's negligence.
A major factor discovered within the last two years for which
punitive damages are sought is respondent's actual conduct in
relationship to the promises made by their advertising and their
expensive charges.

The fact is that respondent's conduct was

not known at that time, and was only ascertained as discovery
progressed and as other facts which have

co'.l.,v~

+--:"'

~i.....,_

-i-~-
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of the general public were learned about their practices.
knowledge was obtained during the last two years.

such

Now appel-

lants can indeed bring their claim for punitive damages.
B. In Peterson v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 79 u 213,
8 P2d 627

(1932), at 220, the court states:

"Where the amendment merely expands or arnplif ies what
is alleges in the original complaint, even though
imperfectly, in support of the cause of action, it is
properly allows."
Later on Peterson, supra, at 221 stated:
"In a tort action an amendment may vary the statement
of the original complaint as to the manner in which
the plaintiff was injured as
to the manner of the
defendant's breach of duty, 49 CoJ. 517: Sargeant v.
Union Fuel Co., supra; Fort Worth Belt R. Co. v. Jones,
Tex. Civ. App. (182 SW 1184)."
POINT IIIo
A LETTER OF INTENT FILED BY APPELLANTS
DOES NOT BAR APPELLANTS' REQUEST TO AMEND.
Appellants' original punitive damage claim falls within
their notice of intent to conunence action as required by UCA
78-14-8.

The difficulty with this statute is that it presupposes

that all plaintiffs have the same knowledge when they commence
a malpractice action as they will have by the day before trial.
Medical malpractice is very complex.
covery.
tion.

It takes years of dis-

Experts must be sought for comprehension and preparaExcept in the most simple cases, plaintiffs cannot be

expected to have the knowledge of whether a punitive claim
should or should not be made.

If the statute is to require

the inclusion of all claims, whether known or unknown, then
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
many health Sponsored
care
providers
willAct, administered
have bytotally
Library Services and Technology
the Utah State Library.erroneous claims
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

made against them because plaintiffs will have no choice but to
include such claims prior to discovery.

The statute's purpose

is to protect doctors from having their reputations maligned by
malpractice actions and induce out-of-court settlement.

The

above mentioned result is contrary to the legislative intent.
Respondent has made several motions regarding appellants'
letter of intent.

As stated previously, appellants' punitive

claims relate solely to the degree of respondent's negligence.
If Appellants' letter of intent fulfills the statutory requirements to allow them to bring their claim of negligence, then
any claims of punitive negligence have the same identical basis.
The degree of respondent's negligence was uniquely within its
knowledge since the beginning of the action.
In order to crystalize the court's attention on the more
important issues of this appeal, appellants have served a new
letter of intent to commence an action upon respondent which
includes a claim for punitive damages demand, thus matting this
issue.
In Yates v. Vernal Family Health Center,

(1980) 617 P2d

352, the court found that any technical difficulties in the
letter of intent could be remedied simply be serving another
letter of intent commencing the action.

*
*
*
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POINT IV.
UTAH'S WRONGFUL DEATH STATUES DOES NOT
PRECLUDE RECOVERY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
The Utah Wrongful Death Statute, UCA 78-11-7, states:
"In every action under this and the next preceding section, such damages may be given as under all the circumstances of the case may be just."
Appellants grant the stubbornnes of the court without the
state to accept punitive damages in a wrongful death action.
However, the question has not been decided by Utah law.

In

Morrison v. Perry, 140 P2d 722, 104 U 151 (1943), the court
discussed the statute in relation to compensatory damages and
provided a definition of compensatory damages.

Defendants are

not sought to be punished by compensatory damages.
simply to compensate the plaintiff for his loss.

They were
Appellants

entirely agree with this definition but it is a definition
of compensatory damages and not punitive damages.

The question

remains, what damages in a wrongful death action are "just?"
This question must be answered for the first time by the Utah
Supreme Court.
Punitive damages measure a degree of wrong and are not a
cause of action.

In Powers v. Taylor, 14 U2d 152, 379 P2d 380

(1963), the court discussed punitive damages:
"Whether such damages are allowable is not dependent
upon the classification of the wrognful act, nor upon
the nature of the injury but upon the manner and
intent with which it is done.
If the wrongful act
by which one injures another is done willfully and
maliciously, our law allows imposition of punitive
damages as punishment to defendant for such conduct,
and as a warning to him and others against it."
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Punitive damages are allowed in any cause of action if
the degree of wrong rises to the level of willful and malicious.
Whether punitive damages are allowed in a wrongful death action
should be no different.

In Terry v. Zions Co-operative Merchan-

tile Institution, 605 P2d 314 (1979), the court found:
"The purpose of a punitive or exemplary damage award
is not to compensate the party harmed but rather to
punish the wrongdoer, to deter him from similar acts
in the future, and to provide fair warning to others
similarly situated that such conduct is not tdlerated."
Thus, punitive damages are not a private right but a public
right.

It is the social policy that certain conduct will not be

accepted in the community.

If the conduct is of such a nature

that punitive damages are demanded had the victim lived, then
how does the social policy differ if the same- conduct leads
to the victim's death?

This gives credence to the ironic comment

heard by lawyers from other lawyers and laymen that if you are
going to commit a wrongful act, it is better to kill your victim
than to maim.
DATED June

-30
- -'

1982.
Respectfully submitted,

~~~ z_ ~~
JAMES E. HAWKES
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify I mailed two copies of the foregoing to Robert
F. Orton and T. Richard Davis, attorneys for respondent, 68
South Main, Fifth Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, June
1982.
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